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ARTICLE
ADAM SMITH ON THE INEVITABILITY
OF PRICE FIXING
Arthur Austint
ADAM SMITH'S PRICE FIXING PARADIGM
Charles Dickens would call price fixing the "best" but also the
"worst" of antitrust violations.' A "fix" can take much of the risk out
of pricing, the tradesman's most complicated and unpredictable task.
Too low and it's predatory, too high and it's monopolization. The
downside is the Draconian penalties-fines and jail time tracked by
treble damages in civil actions. There is also the detection factor em-
boldened by the government's amnesty program which encourages
officers and employees to cooperate with the prosecution in exchange
for favored treatment. Substantively, defendants are confronted with
the per se rule-proof of the act of fixing is a legal issue2 and, under
the per se presumption, proof of economic effects are excluded .
t Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. I appreciate the helpful contributions of Michael Blalock.
' As the author of BLEAK HOUSE (1853), Dickens was familiar with the vicissitudes of
law hence, "the one great principle of the English law is, to make business for itself." CHARLES
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 529 (The Heritage Press 1942) (1853).
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 289 (2003).
An unintended consequence of this emphasis is that the cartels most likely to be dis-
covered and prosecuted are those in which the price and output effects are small.
They are the cartels with many members, so there is a better chance that one will be-
come disgruntled and inform on the others; that depend on explicit and reiterated ne-
gotiation and agreement, which provide the essential evidence of violation; and that
are likely to be riddled with cheating and collapse shortly amidst mutual recrimina-
tion-circumstances that create opportunities to obtain willing witnesses to offer evi-
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The best of times trumps the risk of detection-and people of trade
persistently risk careers and reputations to fix prices. Some are will-
ing conspirators, others are coerced or duped. Once caught they will
offer an exonerating rationalization before abjectly confessing culpa-
bility in exchange for a lighter sentence. The best and the
brightest-and the dregs-are equally vulnerable. In THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS, Adam Smith provides the explanation for this mess:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for mer-
riment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspir-
acy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law
which either could be executed, or would be consistent with
liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it
ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to
render them necessary.4
Smith's lecture implicitly assumes a connection between the cor-
porate raison d'etre-profit maximization-and price fixing.
Tradesmen are dedicated to controlling that which assures their exis-
tence-price. Any monopolist-scrap dealer or computer
mogul-knows that as soon as they set a price, it is "fixed." 5 In most
cases, firms co-exist in an oligopoly where everyone can fairly accu-
rately assess costs, enabling everyone to follow a lockstep pricing
strategy that produces supra competitive profits. Whatever the con-
text there is the trade association which exults the exchange of infor-
mation as an enabler for price stabilization.
But protracted stability is an unachievable ideal; the appearance of
a new irascible rival, technology innovations, external blips like ca-
tastrophe, along with changes in government policy, are constant
threats to price. These are the disturbances that the Invisible Hand6 is
dence of agreement. The smoothly functioning cartel is less likely to generate evi-
dence of actual agreement.
ld.
3 See James Rahl, Price Competition and the Price-Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspec-
tive, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 137, 141 (1962) (discussing the legal ramifications of application of the
per se rule of price fixing). For the best survey and analysis of the law and economics of price
fixing, see Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); reprinted in 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
4 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Modem Lib. Ed. 1937).
5 United States v Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945). Because
price fixing is per se illegal, in turn this arguably renders monopoly-in-fact per se illegal.
6 See SMITH infra note 4.
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programmed to handle by each firm engaging the menace with im-
proved performance and efficiency. There is, according to Professor
Smith, an alternative response; as firms ensconce in a shared identity,
they gravitate to the most effective safety net-price fixing.
I rely on four cases to evoke a predictable course of price fixing as
corporate zeitgeist-a corporate way of life. In American Tobacco 17
the defendant incorporated small rivals into a Smith version of a
"government of towns corporate ' 8 to create a monopoly. After the
Supreme Court ordered dissolution, American Tobacco H extended
the price fixing ethos to a three firm oligopoly. 9 (A portion of the
enormous profits from the Tobacco Trust, as it was called, went to
Trinity College in Durham, North Carolina, on condition that it re-
name to "Duke," after the president of American Tobacco.) The leg-
acy of the General Electric conspiracy is a lesson plan in process-the
tactics used to avoid detection and responsibility. The
Sotheby' s/Christie's conspiracy proves that there is no safe harbor for
price fixing. In the chic fix of the post-modem generation, the major
art capitalists got caught with their hands in the cookie jar.
THE AMERICAN TOBACCO ETHOS
In 1911, Chief Justice White, a civil law lawyer from Louisiana
trained to the literal reading of the Code, anticipated Paul deMan's
glance into the abyss of deconstruction ° by revising the Sherman
Act's prohibition of "every restraint of trade" to read "every [unrea-
sonable] restraint of trade."" He first used the decon ploy to dissolve
the Rockefeller empire followed by the American Tobacco case. The
first Justice Harlan objected to the rewriting of the Sherman Act:
"One thing is certain, 'rule of reason,' to which the court refers, does
not justify the perversion of the plain words of an act in order to de-
feat the will of Congress.'1 2 While Harlan knew that American To-
bacco was a "monster combination,"' 3 he also knew that "every"
' 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
8 Smith, supra note 4, at 124.
9 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944).
10 Arthur Austin, Essay, A Primee On Deeensmru..n-'s Rhapsody of Word-Plays, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 201, 211 (1992).
1 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In his dissent, Justice Harlan
stated that the result of the Court's decision was that the Sherman Act, which refers to a "con-
tract in restraint of trade" will be construed not to "include all contracts in restraint of trade, but
only those which are in unreasonable restraint thereof." Id. at 87.
12 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 192. For more on Paul deMan's glance
into the abyss, see Austin, supra note 10.
'3 Id. at 190.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
meant "every" and White's interpretation could have unanticipated
consequences.
American Tobacco controlled prices the old fashioned way-they
monopolized. Beginning in 1890, the year the Sherman Act was en-
acted, James B. Duke began a campaign to counter the sting from
"various competitions" that periodically surfaced by acquiring every
tobacco related business that could pose a threat, shoring up the
money-makers while closing the marginal operations. 14 In an early
version of corporate restructuring, Duke presented the public with a
faqade of price competition by maintaining the newly acquired firms
as ostensibly "independent concerns disconnected" from American.
15
Lorillard, for example, continued as an "independent" company in
competition with American. The facilitation of price and profit
maximization was, as Chief Justice White said, achieved by "the ex-
ertion of honest business methods brought into play for the purpose of
advancing trade instead of... obstructing and restraining the same." 16
Duke had used the Invisible Hand as a front to subvert competition.
The Company internalized the trade association concept to maintain
the external faqade of open competition.
Chief Justice White explicitly, if not expressly, acknowledged
Smith's concern with the tendency of rivals to collectivize price. In
American Tobacco's case, it was shrewd, ruthless, and eventually
illegal, to play upon the "cupidity of competitors" 17 in order to com-
bine acquisitions with otherwise reasonable contractual restraints to
create a network of sham rivals who, in addition to serving as captive
price fixers, were exploited as barriers to entry. 8 White cited the rule
of reason from Standard Oil v. United States 9 to condemn American
Tobacco for using "trade conflicts designed to injure others, either by
driving competitors out of the business or compelling them to become
parties to a combination. 2°
The remedy phase exposes the no-win dilemma in monopolization
suits created by White's deconstruction of "every." White remanded
to the 6th Circuit for a dissolution decree "recreating out of the ele-
ments now composing it, a new condition. 21 Seeing the quandary,
Harlan argued that White's recommendation cut against the facts.
How can one "recreate" a legal system composed of the very entities
14 Thereby rendering them "useless for the purposes of trade." Id. at 163.
15 Id. at 164.
16 Id. at 178.
17 Id. at 182.
I8 Id. at 183.
19 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
20 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 182.
21 Id. at 189 (Harlan J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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of what White called a "ruthless violation? '22  Under a literal inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act, the monopolization charge would have
subsumed the otherwise reasonable contracts as enablers to the viola-
tion, eliminating them as the basis for repackaging. Harlan, a com-
mon law disciple, anticipated a recreation as a dagger into the soul of
the Invisible Hand in the form of oligopolized shared monopoly.
He was right-the 1911 dissolution decree led to a revised ver-
sion of the old sham "competition" between American Tobacco,
Liggett & Myers, and R. J. Reynolds in an oligopoly controlling 91
percent of cigarette sales.23 During the throes of the 1930s' severe
depression, the three firms were engaged in Smith's prediction on
price facilitation - they were adhering to conscious parallel pric-
* 24ing. Big Three prices were "practically identical since 1923, and
absolutely identical since 1928.'25 During "one of the worst years
of financial and economic depression in the country ' 26 the Big
Three on the same day raised the price of leading cigarette brands
from $6.40 to $6.85 per thousand. The president of Reynolds said
it was an expression of confidence; in the voice of John D. Rocke-
feller's Sunday school lesson,27 the American Tobacco president
called it an "opportunity of making some money. 28
Evidence of parallel pricing alone will not get a price-fixing case
to the jury; there must be a "plus," an accompanying indicia of con-
sciousness, i.e., the agreement.29  In American Tobacco II, the 6th
22 Id. at 190.
23 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States., 147 F.2d 93, 100 (6th Cir. 1944).
2A [C]onscious parallelism is devoid of anything that might reasonably be called
agreement when it involves simply the independent responses of a group of competi-
tors to the same set of economic facts - independent in the sense that each would
have made the same decision for himself even though his competitors decided other-
wise. But the consciously parallel decisions of oligopolists in setting their basic
prices, which are interdependent in that they depend on competitors setting the same
price, are not nearly so easily disposed of on the ground that no agreement is in-
volved.
Donald F. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under The Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655, 663 (1962).
25 Am. Tobacco, 147 F.2d at 103.
26 Id.
27 The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest .... The Ameri-
can Beauty Rose can be produced in the splendor and fragrance which brings cheer
to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds which grow up around it. This is
not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working-out of a law of nature and
a law of God.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 45 (Bacon 1962).
2 Am. Tobacco., 147 F.2d at 103.
29 However, parallel pricing, without more, does not itself establish a violation of the
Sherman Act. Courts require additional evidence which they have described as 'plus
factors.' Examples of these 'plus factors' include actions contrary to a defendant's
economic self-interest, product uniformity, exchange of price information and oppor-
tunity to meet, and a common motive to conspire or a large number of communica-
505
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Circuit cited facilitation factors as probative "plus" indicia including,
a trade association that provided the opportunity for confidential ex-
changes and a vehicle for conspiracy.3 They also recognized the
relevance of historical testimony, reflecting a lingering echo from
American Tobacco 1.31
The American Tobacco experience validates Harlan's prediction
that the government cannot break price-fixing by merely repackaging
the culprits. It also resonates with Smith's warning about a price fix-
ing ethos: the presence of "social and historical relationships which
favor cooperative behavior rather than hard-nosed rivalry." More-
over, according to Justice Burton in the majority opinion affirming
the conviction, "a community of interest ... provides a natural foun-
dation for working policies.., unfavorable to outsiders., 33 He is thus
including ethos as a "plus" in proving conscious parallism price-
fixing and a factor the jury is entitled to add to the mix. Most signifi-
cant is the Court's conclusion that the ethos was so obviously anti-
ethical to the Sherman Act as to constitute a level of circumstantial
evidence justifying a jury verdict of conspiracy.34
A CORPORATE WAY OF LIFE
"They developed complex and unique systems to work out their
conspiracies, utilizing the moon, of all things, to act as signal lamp
for their plans." 35
The shadow of American Tobacco II motivated firms to be wary of
suggestive inter-enterprise contact. More importantly, the demise of
the Rockefeller and Duke empires and the emergence of an oligopo-
lized economy created more dynamic markets in which firms compete
in quality and prices. Nevertheless, while obvious facilitation ges-
tures were eschewed, price-fixing continues to be as "American as
apple pie. 36
tions
(citations omitted). Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995).
3o Am. Tobacco, 147 F.2d at 119. The trade association movement is traced to Arthur
Jerome Eddy's The New Competition (1912) which endorsed the benefits of rivals exchanging
information on market conditions. See ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 232-56
(1912) (noting that collaboration benefits more parties than secrecy and competition).
31 Id.
32 Paul L. Joskow, Firm Decision-Making Processes and Oligopoly Theory, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 270, 278 (1975).
33 Am. Tobacco Co. et al. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 793 (1946).
34 Id.
35 JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS 13 (1962).
36 Arthur Austin, Price Fixing: American As Apple Pie, DAILY LEGAL NEWS AND
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The prototype for the more sophisticated version of price-fixing
came in the 1960s' "G.E. Conspiracy": twenty-nine companies, in-
cluding elites General Electric and Westinghouse, were convicted of
fixing the bid prices for transformers and ancillary products. While
the jailing of top executives got the headlines, lawyers paid attention
to the details of conspiracy. The industry lifestyle was "price stabili-
zation" by bidding according to market share. Under the "Phase of
the Moon" formula G.E., the leader, followed by Westinghouse,
Allis-Chalmers, plus three fringe firms, rotated low bids: "the price
spread between defendant manufacturers' quotations would be suffi-
ciently narrow so as to eliminate actual price competition among
them, but sufficiently wide so as to give an appearance of competi-
tion. ,17
The process was designed to avoid detection and assure efficiency.
G.E., acting as the enforcer, divided responsibility into two groups:
"high level" executives who devised tactics and met with counterparts
to work out details and the "working group," the grunts who imple-
mented the plan.38  The inter-enterprise conspiracy meetings were
conducted with C.I.A. hush-hush secrecy: code names, mail drops,
and false travel vouchers to hide actual trips to meet at places like
Dirty Helen's in Milwaukee. "When they walked in," according to
Helen, "I'd say: 'Here come the big shots again.' They were gentle-
men, and they paid for their drinks."'3 9
One of the more ingenious tactics was Directive 20.5, a company-
wide order forbidding violation of the Antitrust laws and, to empha-
size seriousness, requiring a signature of commitment from every
employee. On its face, it professed the authority of G.E.'s willingness
to assume a burden of accountability. In practice, it engendered the
"quiet wink," a maneuver permitting upper level executives to walk
the high road with an admonishment to the working group accompa-
nied by a "wink" that simultaneously nullified the admonishment.4n
If the "winkees" got caught, they were left twisting-facing discharge
or exile.
CLEVELAND RECORDER 1 (Nov. 21, 1995).
37 FULLER, supra note 35, at 65.
38 Id. at 106.
39 Id. at 174.
40 For the record, a superior officer might say to his underling: 'Joe, let's have none
of this price-fixing monkey business, remember that!' And he would punctuate his
remark with a broad smile and the neutralizing wink which would mean, far beyond
the words on the corporate records: 'Get off your tail and 'stabilize' those prices with
the competitors, or we're going to be in trouble with the profit side of the ledger.'
FULLER, supra note 35, at 124.
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Price stabilization and the threat of twisting was DNA at General
Electric. As employees "moved up through the corporation ranks,
they found that they were inheriting a certain corporate 'way of life'
which had to be accepted, or they were no longer in line for promo-
tion., 41 An "absolute 'way of life, ' ' '42 price stabilization became the
controlling culture-tantamount to company policy-in which the
chairman of the G.E. board, the president, and the executive vice-
president were able to hide behind Directive 20.5.43 In testifying be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, Ralph Cordiner, chairman of
the board, pleaded a complete lack of knowledge about what every-
one else at G.E. practiced as a way of life. The best he could do was
to cite Directive 20.5 and note that he assumed his lawyers were tak-
ing care of antitrust. It was a version of the 'It Wasn't Me' De-
fense"44 raised at the Nuremberg war trials and more recently in
United States v. Taubman,45 the Sotheby' s/Christie's conspiracy.
The G.E. Conspiracy flushed out a pathology that lurks in every
price-fixing afterthought-the no harm, no foul rationalization. After
contacting customers Cordiner concluded that in spite of G.E.'s in-
flated pricing "I don't think any customers have been hurt by it. If we
unwittingly damaged any customer anywhere, we wish to make an
adjustment." 46 The president of another defendant got to the gist of
what Cordiner was trying to say: "No one attending the gatherings
was so stupid that he didn't know the meetings were in violation of
the law. But it is the only way a business can be run. It is free enter-
prise.''47
41 Id. at 58.
42 Id. at 89.
43 Id. at 122. Directive 20.5 prohibited G.E.'s employees "from meeting with competitors
for the purpose of fixing prices and dividing up markets."
44 Susan Pulliam, The 'It Wasn't Me' Defense, WALL. ST. J., July 9, 2004, at B 1 (discuss-
ing various scandals in which high-level executives pleaded ignorance).
4' 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002).
46 FULLER, supra note 35, at 90.
47 Id. at 91.
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ADAM SMITH AND ART
Smith's lecture implied that the "Invisible Hand' 48 of profit maxi-
mization is the authority for bringing tradesmen together in common
cause. Threats to profit-"distress" pricing, over-production, product
fungibility, along with structural conditions-are red flags that will
prompt a collective dialogue, first via trade association and then di-
rectly. For most industries-those that mirror G.E. and American
Tobacco Il-the Smith assumption holds. Its authority becomes
problematical in situations where the profit motive is marginalized.
These are situations where the Sherman Act jurisdictional require-
ments of "trade or commerce"49 are satisfied but the profit motive is
counterbalanced by non-commercial factors. Medicine and law are
obvious examples: in both fields fee scheduling was rationalized as
motivated by consumer protection interests. For lawyers, price fixing
"complemented the objective of the ethical codes." 5  Education is a
more recent example where diversity rationalized tuition price-
fixing.5' These are areas of some familiarity-but only recently did
Adam Smith and the Justice Department visit the elite and snobby
world of Sotheby's and Christie's-the world's largest "Art" auction
houses.
Both Houses are establishment English legacy-both came before
WEALTH OF NATIONS. Sotheby's opened in 1744 with the auction of
a book of "Polite Literature," 52 Christie's emerged in 1766 as the self-
designated "socially superior" auctioneer. Up to the 1980s they co-
existed as wholesalers catering exclusively to dealers shopping for
clients. They competed in expertise and hauteur, like plastic sur-
geons: "people tend to entrust their chins and estate sales to the guy
they know, not to the quack with the lowest price. 5 3 In 1983, Alfred
4 The term "Invisible Hand," incidentally, is mentioned only one time in Smith's opus,
supra note 4 at 423. For a novel but logical interpretation of Smith's use of the term see Jona-
than Schlefer, Today's Most Mischievous Misquotation, ATLANTIC MONT HLY, Mar. 1998, at 16.
Moreover, Smith is not, as usually assured,
an earlier version of Milton Friedman ... He would not have been pleased with the
inequities of income in the United States today. He defended the rights of labor and
deplored the withering effects of specialization on the individual worker. Smith was
a liberal in both the modem and the classical sense. Buried in the work of the great
framer of capitalism as a vast impersonal system, there is a modem humanist.
David Denby, Northern Lights: How Modern Life Emerged From Eighteenth-Century Edin-
burgh, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2004, at 90, 95.
'9 Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
50 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
51 See United States v Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1991); 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir.
1993) (rev'd and remanded).
52 James Surowiecki, Price-Fixing For Dummies, THE NEW YORKER, Dec 4, 2000, at 29.
53 CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBY'S-CHRISTIE'S
AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL 97 (2004). The Economist called Mason's book "a rare beast - a
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Taubman, a shopping mall magnate from Michigan, bought
Sotheby's. He was "a perfectionist who paid an almost excruciating
amount of attention to detail ' 54 and who saw socializing as the way to
get the art business.
Taubman revolutionized the industry by leap frogging the dealers
to exploit private collection clients and to attract the multimillionaire
people who "pay ridiculous prices for things that they value., 55 Auc-
tions became media-social events-lavish promotions sugar-coating
vicious tactics to sign up the blue-ribbon consignments. Sotheby's
offered sellers advances against the consignments then sweetened the
deal with guarantees of a cover even if the piece did not sell. Treating
Impression art and soda pop as fungible, Taubman converted
Sotheby's into a check cashier for the rich. He made art a liquid as-
set, an investment blended with "trophy wives ... the frisson of the
market place . . . to participate in the competitive ritual display of
wealth. 56
Taubman's success titillated the shrewd antenna of Dominick
Dunne, a well-traveled connoisseur of high society skulduggery,
money, and crime, who used him as a model for his character, Elias
Renthal, a self-made billionaire from Cleveland who correctly divines
that the ostentatious acquisition of art will grease the entree for him
and his young wife into the upper reaches of New York society.57
Like Taubman, Elias was successful, achieving grudging acceptance,
if not admiration, only to have Dunne pull the rug. At the end he was
nothing more than another Ivan Boskey-of "Greed is healthy"
fame-as he goes down for insider trading. At his sentencing the
judge says: "Criminal behavior such as yours cannot go unchecked. 58
Dunne's book came out in 1988. On April 23, 2002, Alfred Taubman
was sentenced 12 years for price-fixing. The Judge: "The Law does
not countance robbery. 59
genuine antitrust thriller, a gripping yam of real-life collusion that is spiced up with Picassos,
class warfare, art-market bitchiness and the rather unsettling conclusion that some well-heeled
villains got away with it." What an Art: Christie's and Sotheby's, THE ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.)
Aug. 2, 2004.
54 MASON, supra note 53, at 39.
55 Id. at 43.
56 "Serious contenders occupied reserved seats in the salesroom and sat clutching their
catalogs with one hand, bracing themselves to raise their numbered paddles to make a bid.
Others preferred to place bids more discretely from their stretch limousines or airplanes." Id. at
51.
57 DOMINICK DUNNE, PEOPLE LIKE US 401 (1988). "Some details were so apt that Mr.
Taubman demanded changes by Mr. Dunne." Leslie Eaton, Knight Errant or Erring?
Sotheby's Tale, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2000, at CI.
58 DUNNE, supra note 57, at 401.
59 Carol Vogel & Ralph Blumenthal, Ex-Chairman of Sotheby's Gets Jail Time, N.Y.
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With a tradesman's profit maximization vision, Taubman set out to
convert Sotheby's into a world-wide art shopping mall-the Wal-
Mart of snobbery and cash. But, unlike Elias Renthal, he was not
preaching to a free market choir: instead of tradesman/employees he
had to reorient a "loose confederation of autonomous experts, ' 6° each
opting to maximize reputation over profit. It was doubly frustrating
since Christie's, even more elitist than Sotheby's, was a sitting duck
for rehabitation in free market tactics.
Against this conflicted terrain three events assured a price-fixing
tableau. First came the addition of Diana "Dede" Brooks to
Sotheby's management equation as chief operating officer. A back-
ground at Miss Porter's, Yale, banking, and a flair for the auctioning
process, Brooks possessed the class veneer to relate to the
experts-both her own, and Christie's. More importantly, she thrived
on the tradesman profit vision and quickly became a soul mate to
Taubman's Wal-Mart aspirations. She met him on his level: "hiya
boss !,,
61
Second, Air Anthony Tennant, chair of the Guinness brewing em-
pire took on a second job as chair of Christie's. Albeit of blue blood
wealth, he was at heart a tradesman and a firm advocate of share-
holder value and profit.
Third, the economy, the tradesman's savior and nemesis, went
sour. "The art world experienced the first major jolt of a collapsing
economy on the night of Tuesday, November 6, 1990, when 55 per-
cent of the contemporary art on offer at Sotheby's went
unsold .... ,62 Cut throat competition ensued, with Christie's 48
percent market share gaining at Sotheby's 52 percent expense.
What had been a nasty rivalry over artistic judgment, procurement,
and distribution of art descended to a common Macy's vs. Gimbel's
joust over bragging rights to market share. In the heat, the Adam
Smith protocol emerged.
TtMEs, April 23, 2002, B.1.
60 MASON, supra note 53, at 34.
61 Shawn Tully, A House Divided, FORTUNE, Dec. 18, 2000, at 264, 273.
62 MASON, supra note 52, at 85.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"We Can Talk About Any Goddamn Thing We Want To Talk About, 63
"We Should Cooperate As An Industry. Because We Are the
Industry. "64
It started with a brief encounter at the London Academy of Arts in
September of '91. Sir Anthony identified himself to Taubman as the
new Chairman of Christie's and then, in "a languid, aristocratic ac-
cent" said: "You wouldn't mind if I called, would you? '65 The first
stage in textbook Smith price-fixing dialogue followed two weeks
later when the two contrasting personas sought to establish a common
bond by lamenting the worsening market conditions both houses con-
fronted. Taubman aggressively took the initiative in favor of indus-
try-wide stability by condemning Christie's bad mouthing of So-
theby's as a tactic harmful to both houses as part of a community. It
was the classic Adam Smith collectivization ploy; to Sir Anthony it
indicated "they had plenty in common," an indication that "the fog
was beginning to lift.
66
A price-fixing culture inspires rationalization, which Taubman put
on the table by forcefully making the point that advertising and brag-
ging about market shares tended to produce a pointless adversarial
relationship. He then got to the point: both houses were crazy to give
zero commission concessions and thereby forfeit profits. Tennant
responded by praising the. benefits of a "close relationship" with a
rival: "It takes out a level of competition which is unnecessary. 67
Next came a more specific rationalization: "With a sliding scale based
on value, there should be no legal problem because you cannot price-
fix a unique object.' 68
After establishing a solid bond, the beer and shopping mall moguls
cut to the chase of prices and profit. No more public assertions of
market share. No more poaching of each other's experts. No more
63 American Airlines president Robert Crandall to Braniff Airlines president Howard Put-
nam, quoted in United States v. American Airlines, Inc, 743 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984).
Crandall: "I think it's dumb as hell for Christ's sake, all fight to sit here and pound
the **** out of each other and neither one of us making a ** dime .... I mean, you
know, goddamn, what the **** is the point of it?... I have a suggestion for you.
Raise your goddamn fares twenty percent. I'll raise mine the next morning." Put-
nam: "We can't talk about pricing." Crandall: "Oh bull****, Howard. We can talk
about any goddamn thing we want to talk about."
Crandall was wrong, and instead of going along with Crandall's proposal, Putnam gave the
government a taped copy of the conversation. Id.
64 Alfred Taubman, quoted in MASON, supra note 53, at 143.
65 Id. at 97.
66 Id. at 100.
67 Id. at 116.
68 Id. at 122.
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charitable contributions to get new business. No more "straight"
guarantees, where the house gave up profits over the guaranteed bid.
No more loans below the prime rate. On the "delicate matter" of auc-
tion commissions, the fix was on, with Christie's announcing the next
new price increase to be followed by Sotheby's. The conversation
had followed Smith's script by ending "in a conspiracy against the
public."
69
Smith could never have anticipated the tantalizing cultural clash
between a shopping mall huckster and the Byzantine world of art auc-
tion. Like the driven Elias Renthal, Alfred Taubman successfully
finessed his wealth through art collection into grudging social accep-
tance but could not leverage his considerable entrepreneurial exper-
tise to cope with the intrigues of a dicey menagerie of art collectors.
He, and his counterpart Sir Anthony, assumed that the same price
stabilization ethos from their prior capitalist universes was de rigueur
wherever profit was tolerated. Their palpable dedication to the
American Tobacco-G.E. epitaph is notarized in the obvious fact that
Sotheby's and Christie's were/are a duopoly in which rivals could,
and still do, stabilize prices via conscious parallism. 70  When in-
formed of the fix by Sir Anthony, the C.E.O. of Christie's opined that
it was a superfluous gesture: "Sotheby's and Christie's always follow
each other's commission increases anyway. We can raise commis-
sions without having to put our reputation at risk.",
7 1
Sir Anthony had an excuse for taking a casual approach to the con-
tacts with Taubman. He was conditioned by the experience of doing
business under a relatively benign regulatory regime which avoided
per se restraint of trade illegality by giving parties the opportunity to
get approval for restraints based on rationalization. Moreover, treble
damages was never on the table. But the major benefit was jurisdic-
tion; as an English citizen, Sir Anthony was beyond the reach of U.S.
subpoena power.
There was no excuse for Taubman, who, having made a fortune
under the harshest antitrust system in the world, a "foolish law, 72
69 SMITH, supra note 4, at 128.
70 Mason describes post-trial price parallelism and says: "The great irony was that
Sotheby's and Christie's were keeping their prices in line because of normal market forces,
proving once again that the collision in 1995 had been entirely unnecessary." MASON, supra
note 53, at 357. See also Surowiecki, supra note 52, at 40 (arguing that conscious
parallelism-price-fixing that occurs without an agreement-is the natural product of any
oligopoly).
71 MASON, supra note 53, at 123. A judgment later confirmed. See notes 101-2, infra,
and accompanying text.
72 [fl have been in a minority of one as to the proper administration of the Sherman
Act. I hope and believe that I am not influenced by my opinion that it is foolish law.
I have little doubt that the country likes it and I always say.., that, if my fellow citi-
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nevertheless seemed oblivious to the conspicuous evidentiary trail he
left. His mistake was in ignoring the lesson of G.E.-non-
accountability. Instead of erecting a wall between his role as the in-
stigator and the "working group" of implementers, he demanded di-
rect, up to date contact with Dede Brooks. He failed to rely on a 20.5
directive "knowing wink" cover, which had been so successfully used
in G.E. Blinded by glitter of being a dominant player in the interna-
tional art world, Taubman failed to hide his hubris.
While G.E. instituted a legacy of the resilience of a "way of life"
and the dominating glare of a 20.5 "knowing wink" directive it also
had to endure the downside of getting caught. Incarceration, however
brief, terminates a career. The "way of life" career option lost much
of its luster when the Justice Department adopted an amnesty pro-
gram granting plea bargaining favors to the first executive-employee
fink who cooperates by turning over incriminating information. It
was amnesty that eventually trapped Taubman, squeezed from both
members of the "working group"-Dede Brooks, the flamboyant
CEO at Sotheby's and her counterpart at Christie's, Christopher
Davidge, who both got leniency deals in exchange for damaging tes-
timony. For Brooks it was survival, for Davidge it was class antago-
nism. He hated Sir Anthony.
Dede and Davidge were separated by more than an ocean. She
was a Town & Country media celebrity who generated the where-
withal to be a 'player' in the league of Henry Kravis, the king of the
leveraged buyout.7 3 Disdained by his colleagues as a "boring little
man," a "philistine," and dissed as "the butler," Davidge relied on
street instincts to work his way through the snooty school tie contin-
gent to get revenge as Christie's CEO.74 The leniency program gave
him the opportunity to settle old scores with Sir Anthony and Dede
and, because Christie's needed his testimony to prove they did not
initiate the collusion to get mitigation, they agreed to ignore a puni-
tive clause in his severance contract, enabling him to take $8 million
in retirement. For good measure his testimony put a nail in
Sotheby's, Dede, and Taubman.
From a detection standpoint the execution of the conspiracy was
an open invitation to suspicion. No code names, no fake travel
zens want to go Hell I will help them.
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI 1916-1935 248-9 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press 1953).
73 "Kravis' string of successes forced all the sharks on Wall Street to become players or
lose face." Arthur Austin, Book Review, 44 ARK. L. REV 157, 159 (1991).
74 MASON, supra note 53, at 131.
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vouchers, and no safe communication channels-instead Dede and
Davidge casually and openly met in art auction venues like Zurich
and Manila. Both were not reluctant to discuss their meetings-CEO
to CEO-with colleagues-Dede even lauding the mutual benefits of
the tite a tites. Lack of caution was catastrophic for Taubman when
diary entries evoked an image of concealment in notations such as
"April 1, 1993: CONFIDENTIAL 8:30 Breakfast w/Sir Anthony
Tennant. CONFIDENTIAL. 75
"What Did You Do?"
"What a lot of other people have done before me, and a lot of other
people will do after me. ,76
This was a showcase trial of gossip, money, Art, and sleaze, des-
tined for media posterity. 77 In the New York cocktail-party set the
question was "How did they think they'd get away with it?'' 78 Know-
ing the implications of a defeat the Government came in with a well
prepared and formidable case. Christie's won the race to amnesty and
in a hostile gesture toward Sotheby's brokered a deal to give the gov-
ernment access to Davidge's "hot" notes. Moreover, Sir Anthony
was beyond jurisdiction, eliminating him as a witness. His only ap-
pearance was as a stage prop in the customary role of a "silent chair."
Conventional wisdom called for Taubman to seek a plea bargain: take
a public admonishment, negotiate a mild sentence at a government
retreat, while earning the gratitude of colleagues who otherwise
would have to testify and the Board who would see a trial as a black
hole of money to lawyers. Taubman's bold-and to many-reckless
decision to plead innocent was capped by his "It Wasn't Me De-
fense": 79 as Chairman he was a policy maker whose responsibility
was to impose a grand corporate vision, lecture at "B" schools, and
leave the day-to-day nuts and bolts details to subordinates. "As a
trained architect ... he was involved in aesthetic decisions like the
design of the expanded headquarters on York Avenue" 80 and thus too
distant from the petty details of pricing. His witnesses would (and
" Id. at 323.
76 The character Elias Renthal, speaking in DUNNE, supra note 57, at 335.
77 Sigourney Weaver, slated to play Dede Brooks in a prospective HBO movie, attended
the trial to scope out the "live" Dede. See John Walsh, How the Stage Fell in Love with the Art
Trade, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 3, 2002.
78 Surowiecki, supra note 52, at 40.
79 Pulliam, supra note 44, at B 1.
80 Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, Trial Beginning For Ex-Chairman In Sotheby's
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,2001, at El.
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did) testify that he was bored with operation trivia and "more con-
cerned with what time lunch was served.",
81
The Government's case highlighting the guilty plea of Dede
Brooks forced the "It Wasn't Me Defense" to identify the real "perp,"
which logically could only mean Dede. Taubman's response to the
indictment: "whatever Dede Brooks chose to do, she did on her own
and without my authorization., 82 The gist of what has cynically been
called the "30,000 foot"83 defense is the existence of an incontiguous
separation between the chief executive and the price-fixing culprits,
an argument inapposite to Dede who, as CEO, was atTaubman's el-
bow and reputedly a loyal disciple and favorite. "[S]ome called it a
father-daughter relationship." 84
Taubman's lawyer told the jury that Dede was an ingrate, a female
Gatsby who used the Waspy chorus to break the glass ceiling over her
boss's head. What the jury would hear was the prosecution's "one
witness case" of the testimony of an admitted liar, "a walking reason-
able doubt" who was compelled to earn her debt to the government by
putting Taubman in jail.85 Dede hung tough; she rationalized that
following Taubman's order was in reality a favor to clients, ("[w]e
were killed by what we were having to give away"),86 then surprised
no one with the sex card: in a discussion with Sotheby's lawyers she
accused Taubman of flashing a newspaper picture of Dede accompa-
nied by a sarcastic taunt-"You' 11 look good in stripes. 87
The defense's assumption that it was a shaky "one witness case"
and not enough for a conviction was rebutted by Davidge's suave
performance; beating back a vigorous cross examination, he skillfully
insinuated that Taubman was the primary instigator of the fix.
Threatened by two tough prosecution witnesses, it was time to fish or
cut bait. One group of the defense team offered Taubman's testimony
as the tie breaker. They calculated the jury needed to hear the main
man take the stand and categorically deny the working group's testi-
mony, and expose them as selfish sleezes. For a lawyer who was
prepping Taubman and had detected memory lapses on important
81 Carol Vogel & Ralph Blumenthal, The Autonomy of Sotheby's Chief is Scrutinized in
Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at D3.
82 MASON, supra note 53, at 312.
83 Pulliam, supra note 44 at B 1.
8 James B. Stewart, Bidding War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 2001, at 158-59.
83 Ralph Blumenthal, Carol Vogel, Sotheby's Case Ends on Issue of Character, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at DI.
86 Silly Trial, Silly Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2001, at A19.
87 Disputed by a Sotheby's lawyer who said Taubman asked, "How'd you think I'd look
in stripes?" Blumenthal & Vogel, Sotheby's Case Ends on Issue of Character, supra note 85, at
D1.
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details it was a no go. The jury expert broke the tie by arguing that
"you can only hurt yourself' with his testimony because "[t]he jury
likes him., 88 They may have liked Taubman but they.convicted him
anyway.
89
FROM THE BOARDROOM TO DIRTY HELENS TO THE JURYROOM:
THE OMNIPRESENCE OF ADAM SMITH
The final arbiter of the reliability of Adam Smith's assumption of
an affinity between price-fixing and capitalist socialization is not the
lawyer, the legal academic, or the social scientist; it is the jury. They
examine the facts as filtered through the American
Tobacco-G.E.-Sotheby's endowment and make the final judgment.
Jurors favor flow charts delineating time and events. It provides
context, connection, and nuance. The prosecution highlighted their
summation with a time chart of the twelve meetings between Taub-
man and Sir Anthony. To establish a sense of credibility they pro-
posed adding, as on a background slide, the 225-year old Adam Smith
quote on the inevitability of price-fixing when tradesmen meet.90 The
defense saw the obvious implication and vigorously protested: "it is
totally inappropriate and ...highly prejudicial." It was hearsay.
Since Professor Smith was not available to personally testify on the
credibility of his conclusion the court deleted his quotation from the
chart-but allowed the prosecution to quote it in oral summation,
which they did.91
The jury got Professor Smith's message. In an updated interpreta-
tion of Smith on Price Fixing, the jury foreman said: "You get to-
,,92gether 12 times with somebody, use your common sense. He was
backed by another juror: the flow chart "laid it all OUt. ' 9 3 The story of
the meetings had important resonance with a stubborn holdout who
88 MASON, supra note 53, at 336.
89 The result revives some advice from an experienced trial lawyer who disdained the use
of experts on jury selection but nevertheless hired them. His explanation: conditioned by televi-
sion, clients expected their use and, if he lost the case without one on board, he feared a mal-
practice suit. "Besides," he said, "they are good for laughs." Arthur Austin, The Jury System As
a Bat, CLEv. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 17, 1994, at 1. See also Arthur Austin, The Jury Sys-
tem at Risk From Complexity, The New Media and Deviancy, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 51, 55
(1995) (discussing the difficulties injury prediction).
90 SMITH, supra note 4. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text; infra notes 101-
04 and accompanying text.
91 This was cited by the defense as prejudicial error on appeal. See infra notes 112-13,
and accompanying text.
92 Ralph Blumenthal & Carol Vogel, Ex-Chief of Sotheby's is Convicted of Price-Fixing,
N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at Al.
93 Id.
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reluctantly conceded that "everything revolved around Mr. Taubman
meeting 12 times with the man Tennant .... 94
The Sotheby's jury reaction is a duplicate of a case from my jury
research portfolio. The plaintiffs alleged that natural gas producers
and pipeline distributors conspired to use a settlement from contract
litigation to cloak price-fixing.95 After a 6-0 verdict for the plaintiff
consumers, the judge declared a mistrial; the plaintiffs hired me to
conduct a jury survey in preparation for a second trial.96 It was a
typical antitrust case: long, boring, complicated testimony, and a
modestly educated jury.97  Like the Sotheby's jury, they liked the
illuminating presence of a time flow chart-"it was a heck of a
tool. '98 Instructions were incomprehensible, especially when it came
to "conspiracy." Most jurors had "never thought about it" but knew
from TV that conspiracy was "illegal-something that you're trying
to get away with." "A mistake-like Nixon." To them, documenta-
tion was the key. "Once your mind sees it on paper-[they] can't say
it's not true." 99
94 Steve Dunleavy, Juror: In My Heart, I Don't Believe He is Guilty, N.Y. POST, Dec. 6,
2001, at 3. "[Jlurors who spoke to reporters after the trial said that the guilty verdict wasn't a
close call." Dan Ackman, Outclassed, AM. LAWYER, Feb. 2002, available at
http://www.law.comljsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZQNV7WOXC.
95 New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig. v. So. Union Co., 607 F. Supp. 1491 (D.
Colo. 1984). The case was eventually settled for over $100 million. Jonathan Dahl, Consumers
Gain Unlikely Victory in Antitrust Action in New Mexico, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1984, at 37.
96 A jury survey involves face-to-face interviews on comprehension of substantive mat-
ters, except testimony, lay witnesses, lawyer performance, jury instructions, etc. Arthur Austin,
Next to Shooting Pool, I Like to Interview Jurors, CLEv. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1994, at 1.
97 See generally, ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY
SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1984); Arthur D. Austin, City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co.: Monopolization, Regulation And Natural Monopoly, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 609
(1982); Arthur D. Austin, Second Trials, LrTIG., Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 1984, at 34; Arthur D.
Austin, The Truth - and Consequences - of 'Juror Bonding', 135 N.J. L.J. 546, at 26; Arthur D.
Austin, What Jurors Like - And Dislike - About Exhibits, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMMENT. &
CASES, May 1986, at 8; Arthur D. Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed The Trial, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
12, 1985, at 15; Arthur Austin, Are Juries Obsolete in Complex Litigation? No, But...(Maybe),
CLEv. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 13, 1993, at 1; Arthur Austin, Finally, no bafflegab - just
justice, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 6, 1997, at 111B; Arthur Austin, Jury Experts, Jury Bonding,
And The Dominant Juror, CLEV. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Sep. 16, 1994, at 1; Arthur Austin, Jury
trial taking a pounding, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 14, 1995, at 7B; Arthur Austin, The Jury
System As A Bat, CLEv. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 17, 1994, at 1; Arthur Austin, The Triviali-
zation of the Jury System, 138 N.J. L.J. 1097, Nov. 14, 1994; at 21; Arthur Austin, They're
turning juries into social workers, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 26, 1994, 7B; Arthur Austin,
Traficant needs to win over just one juror, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 21, 2002, at B9; Arthur
Austin, Trial juries not likely to bend in a lawyerly wind, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 20, 1991,
at 21-C; Arthur Austin, Was the Hughes Jury Nullified?, CLEv. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, Sep. 25,
1997, at 1; Arthur Austin, When ajury is locked up, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Sep. 7, 1995, at 11B.
98 Arthur D. Austin, New Mexico Natural Gas Litigation Jury Survey (1984) (unpublished
survey on file with the author), at 28.
99 Id. at 29-30.
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Understanding price-fixing was a challenge; three jurors had never
heard of it and thus had to rely on colleagues for explanation, which
was shaky at best. Several jurors divined that since it involved prices
it was a tactic to make money in a way comparable to robbery-"a
form of embezzlement, white collar crime."'' 0 They reached a fragile
consensus that price-fixing was wrong, but the main problem was in
proof of conspiracy-did the accused do the fix?
In their bewilderment and chagrin at a tedious and confusing proc-
ess, antitrust jurors typically seek some insight from the testimony
that they can relate to-an anchor suggesting a plausible rationaliza-
tion for their subjective impulses. For a monopolization allegation, it
was a smoking gun document that showed defendants "did what their
intent was. They intended to do it and did ... ."1'0 For the New
Mexico jury, as with Sotheby's, the anchor was the tradesman's fatal
attraction for the socialization of prices.
The plaintiffs knew that the defendant authority executives co-
mingled on a Denver to El Paso plane flight en route to a Dallas
Cowboys football weekend. In testimony each executive forcefully
rejected plaintiff counsel's probe on the possibility that "even for
merriment and diversion.., the conversation end[ed] in a conspiracy
against the public .... ,,12 The jury's reaction:
The El Paso Trip
Q. "El Paso, was that the trip where they didn't talk
anything but football?"
A. "Yes sir that was the biggest lie ever told."
Red was not being overdramatic; to many of the
jurors the El Paso trip was the lightening rod of the
conspiracy. As Red added, "After El Paso, every-
thing was cut and dried." M. R. agreed: "This is
where they made a mistake ... this is where we put
1°From a survey of jurors from Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 1990-2 TRADE CASES (CCH) 69,182 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (interview notes on file with
author). See Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, The New Media, and Deviancy,
supra note 89, at 56. See also, Arthur Austin, Another Viewpoint on Juries, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
22, 1993, at 15; Arthur Austin, How the Dominant Juror Dominates, 21 TRIAL LAW. Q. 23, 23-
24 (1991); Austin, The Truth-and-Consequences of 'Juror Bonding', supra note 97, at 26.
101 Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, The New Media, and Deviancy, su-
pra note 89, at 56.
102 SMITH, supra note 4, at 128.
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together [the conspiracy] ... we discussed in the jury
room this thing."
The jurors were incredulous at the "cover story" for
the trip. "It was stupid," according to K.S., "to say
that they didn't talk business." J.C. agreed, "It was
just a social flight according to witnesses-but it was
a business flight-they must have discussed the con-
spiracy." J.B. made the point that within the privacy
of their own plane, they would have talked about
things other than the weather. The incriminating
point, as Smokey pointed out, was that they "all had
the same story-'we didn't talk [business] on the
plane."'j0 3
"It's a universal business in which there are only two major players,
and where there are no trade associations. There is basically no
other forum. One had to meet. ,104
David Boies, who maneuvered a class action settlement with
Sotheby's/Christie's for $512 million, 05 criticized the defense for not
pouncing on the argument that meetings que meetings among rivals is
not per se price fixing. He interpreted Adam Smith as offering the
canon that contact among rivals is a presumption of a fix.1°6 Boies
argued that the testimony of a "respected businessman" assuring the
jury that rivals often meet not to fix prices but to discuss policy and
industry lobbying tactics would be sufficient rebuttal. "You've got to
have an explanation,"' 1 7 he emphasized.
Boies was speaking to an audience of prospective price fixing cli-
ents. He knew that the type of expert testimony he advocated would
be tested by the Court's instruction to the jury on "credibility." And
even a highly credible witness would have to overcome three serious
issues, starting with Sir Anthony's absence which was presented as an
implicit, if not express, admission of guilt (which, in an exclusive
interview with Mason, he denied). And, of course, there was Taub-
103 Austin, New Mexico Natural Gas Litigation Jury Survey, supra note 102, at 29-30.
104 Sir Anthony Tennant, quoted in Austin, id. at 349 (quoting Sir Anthony Tennant).
105 For his account of the negotiations leading to the settlement with Sotheby's and
Christie's see DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 322 (2004). Boies is most famous for his
blistering cross examination of Bill Gates. See David Margolick, The Man Who Ate Microsoft,
VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2000, at 138.
106 See notes 112-13 infra and accompanying text.
107 MASON, supra note 53 at 348.
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man, whose attorney, on the advice of a jury specialist-the jury likes
him"-did not allow him to testify. Moreover, the twelve meetings of
the only two corporate chairmen in relative secrecy were persuasive
enough to get a hold out juror to join the verdict. For cumulative ef-
fect, there was the April 30, 1993, Sir Anthony memo that could be
read as setting up a strategic overview of the scheme. One juror
called it a "timeline of the evidence and laid it all out. 108
"I like a little competition, but I like combination better. "109
For a simple event, price fixing springs from a Byzantine pathol-
ogy. Adam Smith drained the swamps into a tight declarative phrase:
When tradesmen meet they talk price, when they talk price they fix
prices. It is ethos. In the American Tobacco saga ethos was greed,
the dark side of the Invisible Hand.10 The General Electric Conspir-
acy is the textbook on process as poseur-a faqade of public-spirited,
law-abiding policy fronting for winks and non-accountability.
Sotheby's/Christie's is price fixing gone chic-a blend of naivet6,
hubris, and stupidity.
Any responsible e'porate antitrust prevention pr.g.a...' would
devote substantial attention to the Sotheby's/Christie's price fix. It
evolved without a compelling economic or management justification
in an industry in which a serious fix had not occurred in several gen-
erations and probably never would have but for the simultaneous ap-
pearance of Alfred Taubman and Sir Anthony Tennent. Although
tradesmen, both were no longer interested in the gamesmanship of
Directive 20.5 or "knowing winks." Taubman was seeking social
status, and Sir Anthony wanted to soften his Guinness responsibilities
with more contact with privilege. Yet the tradesmen instinct brought
them to meet to scope each other out, share common problems-and
invariably talk prices. Although neither one concedes an "agreement"
t08 Blumenthal &Vogel, Trial Beginning For Ex-Chairman In Sotheby's Case, supra note
80.
'09J. P. Morgan, quoted in CLARENCE H. CRAMER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: FREE AND
NOT So FREE 423 (1972).
11A new oligopoly known as "Big Tobacco" continued the price fixing tradition by bra-
zenly colluding in a "tie-bid" rigging scheme in buying leaf tobacco. The prearranged "tie"
enabled the buyers to share the tobacco according to respective market shares. The case was
settled for $200 million. DeLoach, v. Phillip Morris Co., Inc. 00-CV No. 1:00-CV01235,
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Tobacco Firms, Farmers Reach Deal, WALL ST J., May 19, 2003, at B3.
III "The purpose of this typographical maneuver... is to indicate that the cancelled words
though inadequate, are the only ones available to the writer. It's a flashy gesture, and it makes
an interesting point, though it can quickly become an annoying affection." DAVID LEHMAN,
SIGNS OF THE TIMES 53 (1991). "Preventative Antitrust" cannot adequately transcribe the
maneuvers of Directive 20.5.
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to fix prices, they nevertheless got into trouble because they ignored
Adam Smith's directive.
For the defense, the reference to the tradesmen's quote was an
ominous message. Twenty-nine words from Adam Smith insinuated
a shadow prosecution expert witness into the dialogue. The quote
went up on appeal where it received an antagonistic reception from
the Second Circuit who accused Adam Smith of "impermissibly"
suggesting a rule of law that tolerates a presumption of conspiracy
upon proof of the "mere fact" of contact among rivals-an "imper-
missible suggestion" certified by the imprimatur of "the father of
modem economics."' 12 Acknowledging the Government's admission
that the quote was a frequent reference in price fixing cases a per cu-
riam court warned that without direct evidence of the defendant's
participation in a conspiracy, reference to Adam Smith could result in
remand. 1
13
Learned Hand, the author of numerous antitrust masterpieces for
the Second Circuit, would sigh in disdain at the per curiam's warning.
Censoring the quote will not quash its presence. The reality is that
the typical antitrust juror is not interested in an abstract comment
about tradesmen by a dead economics professor. The reference was
correctly characterized by John Greene, who summed up for the
prosecution, as nothing more than a "rhetorical device."' 1 4 It is Adam
Smith's intuitive judgment on the capitalist instinct that sustains the
credibility of the price fixing canon. When jurors receive testimony
on inexplicable meetings among rivals, they will get the message. As
Red said: "After El Paso, everything was cut and dried." Echoing
Smith, the Taubman jury foreman said: "If you meet twelve times,
you must be up to no good. It's common sense!""1
15
112 United States v Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2002).
13 Indeed, were this a case where the Government asked the jury to infer the exis-
tence of or a defendant's participation in a price-fixing conspiracy, we might well
have vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. We now consider the
Government to be on notice that future uses of a quotation such as the one used in
this case might well prove fatal to its case.
In the instant case, however, the Government relied on the overwhelming direct evi-
dence of Taubman's knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy, as noted
above. Accordingly, we conclude that, in the particular circumstances of this case,
the inclusion of the Adam Smith quotation in the Government's summation was
harmless.
Id.
14 Phone interview with John Greene, Oct. 6, 2004 (interview notes on file with Author).
115 MASON, supra note 53, at 343.
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CHRISTIE'S RAISES ITS RATEs
It has taken Christie's nearly two years to match what
Sotheby's charges buyers. But this week Christie's an-
nounced that it would raise its buyer's premium from 19.5
percent of the first $100,000 to 20 percent on the first
$100,000. Its charge of 12 percent on amounts exceeding
$100,000 will stay the same.
"We wanted to rationalize our price structure worldwide and
to remain competitive" said Marc Porter, president of
Christie's Americas.'16
116 Carol Vogel, Inside Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, B34. Compare id. with supra notes
70-71 supra and accompanying text.

